In conversation, Hanna Hölling (Bern University of the Arts) unpacks the concept of conservation to explore its potential for renewal in the construction of knowledge within the humanities and social sciences, drawing on several research projects she has carried out. This piece is part of a series produced in the run-up to the infoclio.ch 2026 conference, «New Humanities». The series showcases recent projects and reflections, particularly in the field of posthumanism, relational approaches in the humanities and social sciences, and alliances between the arts and sciences.
Rethinking the discipline: Conservation as a form of knowledge
Conservation is usually associated with preserving the material remains of the past. You approach it as a form of critical inquiry. What does conservation reveal about how knowledge is produced, and what might it contribute to the humanities?
Having worked both as a conservator and as a scholar of conservation, I have become increasingly interested in how conservation produces knowledge, particularly when established methods are challenged—when materials deteriorate, technologies become obsolete, or an artwork’s continued existence depends on performance or activation. Conservation inevitably involves judgments about what constitutes a work and what should be carried forward. These judgments may change during the conservation process. They concern interpretation, knowledge, and value as much as technical expertise. I would go further and suggest that conservation constitutes its object as much as it is constituted by it. Conservation does not just act upon something already given. It participates in determining what the work is, how its past is understood, and what its continuity might mean. At the same time, the object's material and historical particularities shape what conservation can know and do.
In my earlier work, I described conservation as a techno-cultural practice, bringing together scientific investigation, historical interpretation, material experimentation, embodied skills, and cultural conjectures or assumptions. What interests me is how conservation produces knowledge while negotiating the identity and continued existence of the things it studies. Examination, documentation, experimentation, and intervention—or the decision not to intervene at all—may reveal previously unrecognized aspects of an artwork. And sometimes it is precisely the failure of a material, the obsolescence of a technology, or the apparent disappearance of a performance that sets knowledge production in motion. Breakdown can become epistemically productive. It exposes the mechanisms and dependencies that may have remained invisible while things appeared intact.
Decay and deterioration
You have written about the value of decay.1 How can deterioration become meaningful rather than something conservation must act against? What might this mean for museums and heritage institutions?
Accepting decay does not necessarily mean abandoning conservation. Deterioration may disclose histories of use, material transformations, environmental entanglements, and forms of temporality that an exclusive commitment to stabilization would obscure. Of course, I am not suggesting that deterioration should be welcomed by default. Instead, I would like to question the belief that material integrity must always be the primary measure of continuity or value.
For heritage institutions, this may suggest beginning with a slightly different query: What, precisely, are we trying to preserve? Material substance, historical evidence, functionality, or experience, and, if so, whose? These objectives may demand different, sometimes contradictory, approaches.
Our research in Activating Fluxus (SNSF 2022-26) examined how practices of activation, including reconstruction, reenactment, and reinterpretation, complicate established distinctions between preservation and change in Fluxus works. The challenge for institutions is to make room for such questions, rather than treating conservation as a technical procedure that follows decisions already made elsewhere.
History, heritage, and possible futures
Conservation makes decisions in the present that shape what is continued. How does this complicate our relationship with the past, and what new challenges do digital technologies introduce?
Conservation is fundamentally concerned with the future, even when it understands itself as a practice of safeguarding the past. There is a paradox here: conservation draws on historical knowledge and interpretations of the past, yet it can act only in the present, with consequences that extend far beyond it. Scholars in critical heritage studies, including Rodney Harrison, Cornelius Holtorf, and Caitlin deSilvey, have demonstrated that heritage is not simply a legacy of the past but a set of practices through which futures are imagined, negotiated, and shaped. What interests me is how conservation participates in this future-making through concrete decisions about the identity and continuity of works, objects, and practices. Crucially, these decisions have material consequences. We intervene in the very things whose future concerns us.
These decisions are selective and political. Institutions allocate resources, establish priorities, determine access, and exercise authority over what receives attention. Yet institutional recognition is not the only means through which things endure. Objects, memories, skills, and practices may continue through networks and activities outside formal heritage frameworks. What survives is therefore often what institutions, communities, and individuals make possible through their actions.
We can anticipate material deterioration and develop strategies for future maintenance, but we cannot know how objects will be understood by those who come after us. An intervention intended to secure the ongoingness of a thing may have unforeseen consequences, while, at the same time, preserving something in one form may limit its capacity to develop in another.
Digital technologies make these tensions particularly visible. Digital preservation is often imagined as a way of overcoming material vulnerability through replication, migration, or emulation. Yet digital objects depend on changing technological infrastructures, software environments, formats, and expertise. Their apparent reproducibility does not eliminate material dependency. A digital artwork may survive through repeated migration while losing aspects of its original behavior or historical context. Emulation may reproduce certain experiences while introducing new forms of mediation. In each case, we must decide what can change without the work becoming something else.
Naturecultures: Beyond disciplinary boundaries
Your research on naturecultures challenges the distinction between natural and cultural heritage. Why does this distinction remain so powerful, and what happens when we encounter something like a glacier that unsettles these categories?
A glacier is a particularly revealing example because it challenges the categories through which we traditionally organize knowledge and conservation. Its formation, movement, and retreat are physical processes studied through glaciology and climate science. But glaciers are also embedded in histories of settlement, scientific exploration, tourism, energy production, and changing cultural understandings of the Alpine landscape. They are places of memory, affective attachment, economic activity, and political concern. We cannot reduce these dimensions to one another, yet neither can we understand glaciers adequately by keeping them apart.
These questions were central to Caring for Naturecultures: The Cryosphere, a symposium I convened at the Collegium Helveticum in Zurich on 12 June 2026, and which was accompanied by an exhibition (Caring for Naturecultures: Glaciers, 12 June – 10 July, 2026). We asked what forms of conservation—of nature, of culture, or something that exceeds this distinction—come to bear on glaciers, and what care might mean in a time of dramatic and irreversible glacial retreat.
Donna Haraway’s concept of naturecultures helps us think through this problem. It challenges the assumption that nature and culture are separate domains that subsequently enter into relationships. Instead, it draws attention to their historical and material co-constitution. Similarly, Bruno Latour’s critique of the modern constitution reveals how the categorical separation of nature and society is itself a historical achievement rather than a given condition. In We Have Never Been Modern (1991), he argues that modernity depends on practices of purification that establish distinctions between humans and nonhumans, nature and society, even as practices of translation and mediation continually produce hybrids that traverse these divisions.
Glaciers offer a particularly compelling example of the limits of such distinctions. Their physical existence does not depend on human interpretation, yet their present condition cannot be understood independently of human histories. Industrialization, energy production, and economic development have become materially inscribed in the cryosphere itself. At the same time, how we understand and respond to glacial retreat depends on scientific knowledge, cultural attachments, political priorities, and institutional arrangements.
Although the nature/culture distinction has been extensively challenged in anthropology, feminist theory, science and technology studies, and environmental humanities, it remains deeply embedded in institutions, disciplinary divisions, and heritage legislation. A conservator of cultural heritage may have surprisingly little contact with a specialist in ecosystem conservation or restoration ecology. Yet their practices raise questions that are often closely related—about change, materiality, interdependence, and time, to name just a few. We continue to organize expertise and responsibility through categories whose limitations we increasingly recognize.
Glaciers also bring to light an unexpected material history. As ice retreats, archaeological objects emerge from places where they have remained preserved for centuries or millennia. These finds can reveal former Alpine routes, relationships between humans and animals, and histories of movement and exchange. Discoveries may also include aircraft wreckage and human remains. The disappearance of ice thus simultaneously destroys one kind of archive and exposes another.
It also complicates what we mean by conserving a glacier. Are we trying to maintain a particular body of ice, sustain glacial processes, preserve a recognizable landscape, or care for the material culture emerging from the melting ice? What about the forms of knowledge and attachment that have developed around glaciers? These objectives are not necessarily compatible, and some may be impossible to reconcile.
In my research on Caring for Naturecultures, I am interested in precisely these encounters between environmental transformation, cultural meaning, and conservation practice. I am also interested in what happens when different forms of knowledge meet and challenge one another. Perhaps the most consequential outcome of such encounters is not finding answers to familiar questions, but discovering questions we did not yet know how to ask.
Communities of practice: The politics of expertise, authority, and disagreement
Your Critical Conservation project asks whose knowledge counts as conservation. What happens when established professional expertise encounters other ways of caring for and preserving things? And what can such encounters teach us about transdisciplinary research?
One of the central questions of Critical Conservation (SNSF 2026-30) concerns how certain practices come to be recognized as conservation while others remain outside its established definitions. Conservation has developed through professional institutions, scientific disciplines, artistic and artisanal traditions, and forms of practical knowledge that do not always share the same assumptions about what should endure. The differences between these approaches matter, of course. But I am especially interested in who has the authority to decide what counts as conservation in the first place.
Our project, developed with my colleagues Juliana Robles de la Pava, Samidha Pusalkar, and Marcello Rechberger, and an expanding network of fellow interlocutors, draws on the concept of communities of practice. We examine how knowledge and skills emerge through shared activities, participation, and the negotiation of common purposes. Professional conservators belong to such communities, but so do artisans, artists, Indigenous knowledge holders, and many others whose practices of maintaining and transmitting material worlds may not be recognized within established professional frameworks.
We are particularly concerned with forms of knowledge marginalized within dominant Western understandings of conservation, including practices developed in formerly colonized societies across the Global South and in parts of Eastern Europe, although the histories and mechanisms of marginalization differ considerably across these contexts. These practices have their own histories, forms of expertise, and ways of negotiating continuity. They do not need to be validated by Western conservation in order to exist as meaningful practices of care and transmission.
At the same time, I would be cautious about romanticizing communities or setting institutional expertise against supposedly more authentic forms of situated knowledge. Communities are not homogeneous. They are shaped by differences of generation, gender, occupation, access to resources, and responsibility. Disagreements exist within communities as much as between them, and can reveal power relations that otherwise remain concealed.
We encountered related questions about who is entitled to undertake conservation work in our earlier research on Activating Fluxus. Fluxus works often exist across objects, scores, performances, and subsequent interpretations. Their continuation may involve reconstruction, adaptation, or artistic reinterpretation of works. This raises questions about who is entitled to interpret or transform Fluxus works, whose knowledge informs their activation, and how such decisions affect their future.
Critical Conservation extends these questions to other practices and understandings of continuity. For us, transdisciplinary research becomes critically productive when it also examines the conditions under which collaboration takes place: who defines the questions, whose knowledge carries weight during the research, and who has the authority to act on its conclusions.
The limits of care: Intervention, responsibility, and letting go
Care has become an important concept in the humanities and environmental thought. But can care also be selective, paternalistic, or even destructive? How do we distinguish responsible intervention from the need to let go?
I think we need to resist the temptation to treat care as an unquestionable ethical good. Feminist care ethics, developed through the work of scholars including Carol Gilligan and Joan Tronto and subsequently expanded through feminist science studies and environmental humanities, has challenged ethical models centered on autonomous individuals and abstract principles. It foregrounds dependency, relationality, vulnerability, and the labor required to sustain lives and worlds. We have written on this concept extensively within the research project Performance (see this open access chapter). But this tradition also teaches us to question care itself. Who decides what needs care? Who provides it, who benefits, and who bears its costs? Care can be selective, paternalistic, and sometimes destructive, even when motivated by good intentions.
Consider the protective geotextiles used on selected areas of Alpine glaciers. These coverings can substantially reduce melting in the areas they protect, but they cannot halt the broader retreat of glaciers driven by global warming. They have been employed, among other purposes, to protect areas associated with ski tourism and its infrastructure. Their use is also controversial, particularly because of the environmental impacts of synthetic materials, including the waste they generate and the potential release of microplastics.
Looking at these vast, shroud-like coverings stretched across the ice, ostensibly to protect it from melting, a more fundamental question emerges: What exactly are we conserving here? A body of ice? A familiar landscape? Or the economic activities that depend on the presence of the cryosphere? Such interventions may achieve specific, localized objectives while leaving the larger causes of glacial retreat untouched. Yet the language of protection can obscure these distinctions, making it difficult to discern what is actually at stake in such preservation, for whom, and at what environmental cost.
An intervention may reduce one form of deterioration while producing other problems. It may maintain something valued by one group while limiting possibilities for others. Conversely, refraining from intervention may allow certain processes to continue, but it can also expose something to preventable damage. Neither intervention nor restraint is per se the more responsible choice.
The issue of letting go is particularly difficult. I would distinguish accepting transformations that cannot be prevented from relinquishing responsibility for changes that could still be mitigated. A disappearing glacier, an endangered ecosystem, and a deteriorating artwork raise fundamentally different questions. Their forms of continuity, the consequences of their loss, and our capacities to intervene differ in each of these cases substantially.
There are circumstances in which preserving something in its familiar form is no longer possible, or in which attempts to do so may cause further harm. Care may then involve documenting transformation, maintaining knowledge, mitigating consequences, or acknowledging losses that cannot be repaired. Caitlin deSilvey has developed the concept of curated decay in relation to such questions. But letting go should not become a convenient ethical vocabulary for abandonment. Similarly, care does not mean limitless preservation, at any cost.
For me, care means remaining accountable for what we do and what we choose not to do. This becomes especially important when the continued existence of things we value can no longer be secured through technical or material interventions.
The New Humanities: What conservation can contribute
The conference asks how the humanities might renew their explanatory potential and their effects in the world. If conservation has something to contribute to this renewal, what would you most like scholars in other fields to take from it?
What interests me is how conservation might challenge some of the assumptions through which the humanities have traditionally understood knowledge, materiality, and historical continuity. Many questions that concern me—about situated knowledge, material agency, responsibility, and the politics of expertise—have long been explored in feminist scholarship, science and technology studies, anthropology, critical heritage studies, and environmental thought. Conservation does not need to claim these questions as its own. What it can offer is a particular way of encountering them through practice. It brings interpretation into contact with materials, their transformations, and the consequences of decisions about their future.
I also think conservation can draw attention to the often inconspicuous work of maintenance, repair, and upkeep. These activities have received considerable scholarly attention, yet they can still be overshadowed by theoretical narratives of creation, innovation, or destruction. Conservation asks us to look at what happens in between, on the ground: the adjustments, repairs, embodied skills, and negotiations through which things continue. Such practices, rather than being secondary to cultural production, are among the conditions that make it possible.
In conservation, we often encounter things that do not fit comfortably into the categories that structure our thinking (e.g., material – immaterial, nature – culture). I find these moments especially revealing because they force us to ask whether the difficulty lies with the things themselves or with the frameworks through which we try to understand them. Perhaps conservation’s contribution lies precisely here: in confronting us with assemblages of material realities and knowledge practices that do not behave as expected.
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Hölling, Hanna B.: What of Conservation? After Permanence: On Decay as a Critical Ethics, in: Herri, 2026, <https://herri.org.za/13/hanna-b-holling/>, Stand: 17.11.2026.
