The Forgotten Army's Forgotten Operations. The reoccupaion of Malaya in the Aftermath of the Second World War

On 9 September 1945, the largest Allied amphibious operation in Southeast Asia of the Second World War and its aftermath was carried out. This operation, however, is fairly unknown. The so-called Operation Zipper was an operation mainly planned during the last year of the Second World War. Its aim was the recapture of British Malaya, which had been occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army in 1941/42. The operation was supposed to be a spectacular, huge amphibious landing on Malaya’s western coast. It was planned and carried out by the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), which had been established in 1943. This command, although Allied on paper, was mainly comprised of Commonwealth, and in particular, Indian troops. The majority of the SEAC staff were British. The planning process leading up to Operation Zipper had been hampered by a variety of factors, such as a lack of resources and a failure to define a clear British strategy for the war against Japan. Only weeks before the operation was to be carried out, Japan surrendered. Nevertheless, it was decided that Operation Zipper should still go ahead. In the end, the operation was carried out on a modified scale. Whilst the number of forces landing on beaches on Malaya’s western coast was impressive, the actual operation was not. Operation Zip- per was no longer taken seriously by many involved and the operation turned into utter chaos. Rather than landing onto the beaches, many vehicles and equipment sank into the beaches, which were far too soft. In the end, Operation Zipper was a disaster and nothing like the trium- phant return to Malaya it was originally planned to be. No extensive historical research on Malaya’s reoccupation has been conducted so far. Usually, the British return to Malaya is merely stated as a fact. If it is addressed at all, Malaya’s reoccupation is only mentioned superficially. There is hardly any discussion or analysis, and reasons given by those involved in the operation are readily accepted. Therefore, it was necessary to consult a number of primary sources in order to gain an indepth understanding of Malaya’s reoccupation and the planning process leading up to it. In particular, a variety of sources obtained from the National Archives of the UK in London have contributed to this research. This study looks at events leading up to Malaya’s reoccupation chronologically. The starting point is Britain’s loss of Malaya, which is followed by an analysis of the planning process for Malaya’s recapture throughout the years 1942- 1945. Various reappearing themes linked to Malaya’s reoccupation are also incorporated in the thesis, such as Allied relations between Britain and the USA, relations within British circles, the issue of an overall British strategy of the war against Japan and Britain’s future as a great power. A particular focus is on the time between Japan’s surrender and Malaya’s reoccupation. During this period, it was decided to carry out Operation Zipper despite Japan’s surrender. This decision has never been seriously questioned in secondary literature and the usual answers given to this question are everything but convincing. The thesis investigates this question thoroughly and comes to the conclusion that there are a variety of reasons for carrying out Operation Zipper despite the enemy’s surrender. The explanation for this decision is closely linked to the history of SEAC which carried out the operation, as well as Britain’s colonial past and future.