On Resentment
An Interdisciplinary Workshop on
The History of Emotions

Abstracts

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After the experience of the Thirty Tyrants, the democratic Athens imposed itself an obligation: mé mesiakainein, to neutralize the corrosive effect of resentment. The amnesty permitted to re-create a civic community, moving the attention on the future. On the contrary, the resentful 'looks back', refuses the political burden to imagine the future and wants just to balance the past. It is not a coincidence that the one that harder criticized the passion of resentment is also, at the same time, the theorist of oblivion, i.e. Nietszche (see the second of the Untimely Meditations, On the Use and Abuse of History for Life): the core question is the idea that health and life are strictly bounded to a certain degree of oblivion. Who is obsessed by the past has no space to start over, living his present life and projecting his future. It is possible to apply this dynamics not just to individual life but also to political communities, as the preceding example of Athens show.

In the third tragedy of Aeschylus' Oresteia -The Eumenidis -we can find some indications about this issue expressed in mythological terms: the Erinyes aspire to condemn Orestes for the murder of his mother. Due to the intercession of Athena, he is judged by a jury, and after the trial Orestes is acquitted. Athena persuades the Erinyes to accept the verdict and to abandon their intention to punish Orestes for his crime; in this way they became the Eumenidis, living in Athens – honoured by the citizens – and assuring wealth and peace to the polis. In theoretical terms: the violent and vindictive effects of resentment are neutralized through the institution of a juridical procedure which has also the right to exculpate the defendant. Amnesty and the sincere recognition of an institution in charge of the administration of justice are necessary preconditions to assure a peaceful future to the polis. It is important to highlight (1) the difference between anger/rage and resentment. Resentment surfaces when anger sinks to a sub-thymotic level: it is an amorphous rage, which has lost “collectability, transformability and cultivatability” (Sloterdijk). Resentment is an entropic rage which intoxicates life: it is the poisoned fruit of the duty to be patient. When anger lacks believable plans for the future, it goes 'in loop' and becomes resentment. For this reason I do not think that resentment is neither the unique nor the principal movebo for revolutions: they look forward in direction of utopian world. The housemaid of the Tocqueville's family made a smile when she heard the noises of riots, not a sneer (Negri).

(2) Resentment is not a monochrome negative emotion: it is a speechless and masochistic reaction to injustice; but it is still a reaction and thus a symptom of the ability to recognize and perceive the injustice. A world without resentment can be either the Jérusalem Céleste or a social darwinistic world, which is impermeable to ethic and insensible to injustice. Resentment im-poses injustice as a social problem: it is deeply different from the acrimony and the arrogance of the winners. In political field it is possible to identify three different ways to deal with past injustice looking at the future, taking example from recent history; (a) the Nurenberg process: this is the example of a justice where it is possible to find traces of resentment. What the Nazis did is unforgettable and then unforgivable (Jankélévitch). (b) Chile's Amnesty Law: the attempt to break with the past through the amnesty for the crimes of Pinochet's dictatorship was a (clumsy) try to neutralize resentment. On the contrary, the lack of legitimacy of the people and institutions who proposed this amnesty can cause a rise of resentment: when justice is impossible, resentment is the last resource for the victims. (c) The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa): this is the most interesting try to balance past and future, searching neither revenge nor oblivion. The public truth can be a form of compensation without violent consequences; this could be an escape route from resentment, the overcoming of the vulnus of violence without oblivion.

(3) Violence and resentment. The difference between rage and resentment – from the point of view of violence – is not quantitative but qualitative: the violence of angry people may be brute, but it can have 'maieutic force' for a new social order. On the contrary, the violence of resentful people is blind because it is 'back-looking' and – literally – without future. The violence of resentful people has no future, abdicates to the future and it strives just for compensation. This is the arrogance of the positively privileged and their Rechthaberei. I prefer to use the Italian word livore, which derived from Latin livor, -oris: bluish color, livid spot. It reminds the colour due to the nausea of those who risk indigestion, the riches and 'sated'.

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Look Back in Anger. Resentment, Justice and Violence.
Resentment as Imaginative Event?

The etymology of the word emotion invokes a movement from inside to outside, from the Latin verb "exmoveo," which means "move-out, out, to burst." What we argue, in our cybernetic studies and research on cognitive models, is that emotion is a movement from inside to inside. The presence of an external hint generates re-emergence of memory sedimented during the time, so the clue is the germ for the emergence of memory states that resonate with the clue itself. The emerged, drawing the entire physiological network, reconfigures this exactly in the same state as it was when the sedimentation occurred. The ego also finding himself the same condition, dragged from the evocative event in the same scenario. Then the system is ready to take action in the environment, but to do it, the system needs to implement an amount of chemical energy that sustains it. Where does this energy come from? The differential, created at the mental level between final imagined stage, and current rebuilt status, starts a process towards coincidence, which releases energy. All this is functional to the movement. The perception of this activity is the emotion. The emotion is therefore the result of a mental process that involves the sensual, sensory, and muscular networks. Can we participate in the evolution of our emotions? According to our hypothesis, if emotions are the result of a mental process centered on ourselves, to intervene in the process it would be sufficient to model the scenario before it is executive, and before it slips away from our perception. If the resentment is an emotion (an imaginative figure resulting by an event, the result of an intellectual process), then the resentment can be addressed as an intellectual process. At intellectual level we expect to be there, not as spectator only but as participant able to intervene to change, and with new sediments to enrich the process itself. Everything above comes from studies and research developed in ENEAFrascati Research Center, since the early ’80s. This study starts from analysis of the knowledge of how the process by "perceptions" leads to the "actions". The research is based on a new technological philosophy, using different cultural approaches; Physics, Physiology, Engineering, Philosophy, Psychology, etc., that blend into a single integrated and organic cognitive approach. The project target is to emulate the own behavior of a biological intelligence. The project’s domain concerns the conceiving of a cybernetic model that emulates the process intrinsic in the intelligent system of the biological "machine". Using the cybernetic model conceived, several intelligent technological applications were designed and realized, in collaboration with several Large, Small and Medium Enterprises covering different application fields as:

**VISIO**: our vision system that was created for industrial robotics. When Visio is applied to humans becomes a device capable of converting a tactile image from an image captured by a camera.

**ANTI-SWAY MODULE**: is derived from cognitive sciences applications. The module aims is to solve the most important problem of the containers movement into the port: the load swaying crane movement. It has been successfully tested before on scaled models and after on an industrial crane located on the port of Le Havre.

**SMART FLEX**: in collaboration with CRF (FIAT Research Center) and COMAU, is implementing a video inspection system for detecting the position of a body car part, which the position isn’t known. This system will be applied to an existing workcell. Deepen the emotional processing of human biological machine, will bring our research group to design intelligent machines equipped of an emotional process.

Righteous Wrath and Personal Resentment: the Education of the Spenserian champion of Justice in “The Faerie Queene”.

My article examines views of the difference between righteous wrath and personal resentment in Elizabethan discourses of justice. The first section of my essay focuses on an analysis of the Elizabethan understanding of the emotions of “anger” and “resentment” in the light of influential philosophical writings (Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, Seneca’s *De Ira*) and theological works (Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*, contemporary popular treatises by Reformed churchmen like William Perkins and Thomas Becon). Texts by professional soldiers (Barnaby Rich, for example) and advocates of the “honour code” derived from the chivalric ethos (the herald William Segar) are also analysed. The second section of my article deals with two significant treatments of the theme of resentment in a poem, Edmund Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*, and in State papers and letters by Queen Elizabeth I.
The theme of resentment is at the core of the Spenserian reflection on the ethical and legal boundaries of uses of private and state violence in *The Faerie Queene*. Distinction between rightful and unrightful violence is in fact a central concern in the Spenserian discourses of justice as it is in contemporary theological, legal, and literary documents on the subject. But whereas Spenser’s dramatizations of what distinguishes the violence of the righteous from that of the wicked reflects faithfully the legal and theological orthodoxy of his day based on the discrimination between public and private violence, the emphasis in his texts falls on other concerns. While contemporary discussions of the righteousness of violent acts focused very much on the capacity and warrant of actors, Spenser’s texts represent these conditions as necessary, but not sufficient and construct the view that the avenger’s motives and ends are to be scrutinized as closely as his authorization. Even the Knight of Justice in *The Faerie Queene* at times fails to distinguish between private vengeance and justified punishment, righteous wrath and personal resentment.

The theme of resentment is also prominent in Queen Elizabeth’s writings in the difficult years preceding and following the execution of Mary Queen of Scots in 1587. In her 1586 speeches to Parliament, her Proclamation of Mary’s death sentence and her letters to Mary as well as to her son, James VI of Scotland, Elizabeth repeatedly declares herself free from “malice” and “rancour”. I argue that the Queen’s appropriation of contemporary discourses of resentment is one of the strategies she uses to separate herself from the judgement and execution of Mary and construct a discourse of innocence in the private eyes of James and in the public eyes of her subjects.

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*Mechanisms of Collective Resentment: Gender Wars and Alteration of Patriarchy in Eighteenth Century Rural France.*

Historian Barbara H. Rosenwein has argued that people in the Middle Ages lived in “emotional communities”, each community having its own very particular norms of emotional valuation, expression, and gestures. In this paper, I examine rural communities and their emotions with particular reference to the relation of debt/credit to the local economy from 1680 to 1789. The eighteenth century was a key period in the transition between precapitalism and capitalism when many structural changes occurred. Those changes can also be observed in rural areas. I am particularly interested in female peasants who did benefit from the new economic changes, as they gradually became essential partners in economic transactions in the credit market and the land market in particular.

As these women became gradually more involved in economic activities, a reaction toward this breach in the patriarchal system followed. It is my contention that men (and also some women) became angry, sometimes humiliated, because they had to deal with the new economic position of female peasants, which undermined the traditional authoritative role of men as leading actors in the economy, and which also altered patriarchy as a social norm. Resentment toward women was particularly expressed in local courts, which testify to a rise in cases of ordinary violence against women.

Peasants’ emotions in the Old Regime constituted a set of complex and interrelated feelings and sentiments that shaped societal relations and regulated everyday life. Emotions did things as Sara Ahmed put it recently, and should be analysed as an historical object in their own right. Emotions had multiple meanings and effects, and were also manipulated in turn. They expressed the way people lived and interacted. It is my contention that emotions in rural communities in the Old Regime had social and economic functions and followed rules and norms invented and moulded by the peasants themselves. Resentment is one of these emotions and will be analysed as a historical object on its own in this paper.

As a case study for this paper, I have selected a rural area located in the south of Alsace, on the border with the Swiss cantons, and only a few miles away from Basel. There, peasants traded, exchanged and lived together in an “emotional community” as described by Barbara Rosenwein. Thanks to the analysis of about 3000 civil judicial records of the seigneurie of Delle in Haute-Alsace running from 1680 to 1785, it is possible to examine the origins, signs, and effects of collective resentment toward women’s new economic role within the community. The local justice records I have examined, called the “registres d’audiences”, are one of the best sources for the study of rural communities. Particular attention will also be devoted to the formation of a collective social identity in response to the threat to patriarchy. Civil judicial records from this period are underexploited, yet, in the absence of peasant self-narratives, these documents reveal interesting features about emotions.

This paper will show how resentment, as a community emotion was triggered and worked in an early modern society. Women’s new economic role within society did not correspond to the traditional system of patriarchy in
which their economic and social role was significantly reduced, and, therefore, launched a complex set of emotions within the society —among which resentment can be distinguished.

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Opening Exhibition “Visual Study of Resentment”.

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Is it Interesting to Qualify as Resentment Some Episodes of the Priority Quarrel Between Leibniz and Newton? Reflexions on Psychological Aspects in History of Science.

Because the priority quarrel between Leibniz and Newton about Calculus is certainly one which lies at the foundation of History of science as a specific intellectual domain, it has received as many explanations as there are different ways of telling what science means, including some nasty nationalists biases. A very surprising aspect is that the two protagonists never met, but exchanged letters from 1676 onwards, the quarrel beginning around 1700 only, but having lasted far after Leibniz’ death in 1716. It was still being mentioned as an important issue in textbooks a century later. However, during the XXth century, most historians or epistemologists avoided what they despised as « psychological factors » because they wanted to rely on positive facts only. And rare are literary essays or novels having used this quarrel as a subject, where resentment may be understood as an artistic reaction to the creation of Calculus, and a sense of personal property. What I wish to explore is not another investigation of the documents we know about Leibniz and Newton, as we are in a good situation nowadays after the publication by Derek T. Whiteside of Newton’s Mathematical Papers, and even after the publications of Newton’s works on alchemy or on prophecies. I don’t wish to study resentment in this case as distortion between real motives and claimed universal values as they were called by social studies on science, due particularly to the importance of mathematics in both cases. It seems to me that was then changed was the idea a creator had about his intellectual property compared with what such a creator used to have earlier in the old Republic of Letters? How were the young Academies of science, in Paris and London, to play a part in the organization of (national) resentment? How was religion (both authors were protestants) to play a part by possibly giving charge for someone to oppose scientific atheism?

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Don’t Look up in Anger. The Decline of Resentment in Contemporary Society.

This paper takes issue with widespread understandings of contemporary Western societies as characterized by massive resentment, by arguing the provocative thesis that this emotion does not play a major role in our present social life.

The framework of this diagnosis is an anthropological perspective challenging a view of emotions as universal, unchanging, embedded in human nature. In fact, according to an outlook which I find developed in Max Weber’s sociology of religion, emotions and, generally speaking, the features of subjectivity (their interests, purposes, capacities) are entrenched in both material conditions and the world view (Weltbild) of a society, and hence historically variable. Not only the form and the object of emotions depend on the cultural treatment they are subjected to, but their very emergence is regulated by the overall climate (material as well as cultural) of a society.

As against this anthropological background, my stance is that some changes which have occurred in late (post-) modern societies are leading to the progressive decline of resentment as a widespread social emotion. Here I would like to draw attention on three figures which represent a sign of the times as far as the passing of resentment is concerned.

- **Lifestyle**: the hyper-individualism of consumption turns into the proliferation of strictly personal lifestyles, among which no comparison (and hence, no envy-resentment) is possible. Paradoxically, to base one’s self-esteem on consumption protects from a competition based on objective criteria: lifestyles cannot be hierarchized according to their worth.

- **Facebook**: thanks to devices like the social networks, social recognition is no longer a scarce resource: everybody gets their little bit of visibility (either esthetical, or intellectual), whereas in the past some selection
was needed to gain access to the public sphere. And obviously, selection used to produce exclusion, which may well give rise to resentment.

- Big Brother: these shows function as a social lottery which fuels the perception that desirable status is accessible to anybody by non-challenging, non-enduring strategies. Instead, resentment flourishes in societies in which the fixity of social hierarchies seems to condemn to a lifelong inferiority. However declining resentment may be, this is not to say that competition and comparison-based identities are bound to fade as well. They are rather probably more dominant as ever, but they do not generate resentment, nor any emotions addressed to those who are somehow superior.

In particular, they do not excite rage, which is the emotion involved in the perception of something unjust. This allows a brief excursus on the relationship between resentment and rage. The spectacle of inequality excites rage when this unfairness violates one’s moral convictions, whereas I assume resentment as the feeling associated with the awareness of other people’s deserved excellence. Though some authors tend to make the two concepts-emotions collapse, I would keep them distinguished: if someone experiences anger or indignation because a situation clashes with their idea of justice, I would not label this “resentment”.

However, rage is just as culturally situated as any other emotions, and the contemporary world view does not leave any room for it either. A dominant feature of present representations of social reality is an attitude I would call “realism”, that is the reversal of the theological stance Weber defined “theodicy of fortune”: not so much “I won because I was right”, as “I am right because I won”. Within such a view, no perception of injustice, and hence no rage is ever possible.

Thus, my final assumption is that the subjectivity which used to feel resentment and/or rage towards those above them has been substituted by a subjectivity which grows at those below them (either migrants, minorities, or convicts).

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Responding to Injury: On the Shadow Economy of Female Resentment.

Given the idealization of nineteenth century women as passive, docile, compassionate, and emotional beings how did they experience and express the emotion of resentment without being dismissed as being overly emotional and/or bitter? What, if anything, enabled the expression or representation of female resentment to be taken seriously and therefore to have consequences –emotional, political or social? While male resentment has been recently examined as the emotional precursor to righteous acts of revolt on the part of victims– whether as individuals or as societies (Ferro, 2009, Tomelleri 2004) female resentment, historically, seems to be acknowledged mostly in the singular. Much has been written on the problematic uptake and expression of anger for women, particularly from a feminist perspective (Frye, Campbell,) but we have yet to examine why resentment has failed to be expressed by women and perceived by others as a righteous emotional response to a perceived injury and injustice. In my essay, I examine how the expression of female resentment functions as a shadow economy to normative nineteenth-century expectations that women be the compassionate and moral regenerators of society. Seen as the emotion of unforgiveness (Brudholm, Amery) in women it comes to represent their failure to act according to their “natural” desire to be compassionate and forgive. While focused on understanding expressions of gendered resentment in a specific historical context, my theoretical framework is informed by contemporary debates on emotions as “contested terms negotiated in a public sphere where power is distributed unevenly (Guss 2009, Nussbaum, Ahmed, Butler). From this perspective emotions are not seen just as universal and biological responses but as expressions embedded in and productive of a particular social and political context. In other words, I propose to examine the presence or absence of resentment in nineteenth-century texts as a political and social problematic and not just as an existential expression of the injured (ill, mad, bitter, aged, etc) self. More specifically, my paper will explore the question of female gendered resentment as expressed in the writings and autobiographical photographs of two of Italy’s most devoted Risorgimento patriots: Cristina di Belgiojoso (1807-1871) and Virginia Verasis di Castiglione (1837-1899). Both women participated actively in the process of Italian nation-building known as the Risorgimento but expressed their resentment at being dismissed and exiled from political influence in very different ways. Belgiojoso’s essay Della presente condizione delle donne e del loro avvenire (On the Present Condition of Women and of their Future) published in 1866 provides an example of how female resentment against the “immobility of women’s condition” is channeled away from anger, bitterness and demands for freedom, into imagining a righteous and radical revolution in the social edifice without a single “brick” of the edifice touching the ground. What might seem as her overly moderate and cautious call for social reform constitutes instead a profoundly tactical response to the social dismissal of female resentment. Her foundational metaphor for a new social edifice takes as its point of departure, as I will argue, the need to make female resentment work positively for women as opposed to bolster male arguments for their dismissal in the political arena. Castiglione’s case offers a different, profoundly
personal, view of how female resentment at being first used by and then dismissed from the political arena of Risorgimento politics finds self-expression through the new (to her time) medium of photography. Castiglione’s “obsession” with photography offers her a means for aesthetically engaging with feelings of resentment, humiliation and a desire for revenge. Her clinical-minded photographic evaluation and fetishization of her aged body-parts (legs, arms, face, feet) mirror’s resentment’s “twisted sense of time” (Amery) and its obsession with a past it cannot forget or forgive. These two cases of female theorizing and aesthetic channeling of resentment address the question of how women, in the nineteenth-century, strove to be heard in their expression of strong feelings of social/sexual injustice without being dismissed as overly emotional women.

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A close look at post 19th century uses of resentment places us in front of a series of difficult paradoxes that any representation of this emotional experience poses from a political point of view. Following Nietzsche and Scheler, resentment refers to bitter feelings of anger and hatred that are nevertheless repressed. This emotion emerges in a power relationship in which those below feel totally impotent and overwhelmed by their situation. Being unable to act, they repress those bitter feelings. Nietzsche and Scheler’s definitions of resentment are anti-social – the situation of those below is due to their own (in)abilities and not to the dynamics of the social structure. Nevertheless, they touch on important questions that traverse social research and its understanding of resentment these days.

Central to their definition is the idea of suppression. Theirs is therefore a post 19th psychological understanding of a subject that it is divided between what (s)he feels, expresses and does. In contrast to the passive character of resentment, many sociologists of collective mobilisations and other actions like vandalism have presumed resentment as the bases of these. On the other hand, resentment is often presented as a latent feeling that under certain circumstances can be given form in political actions of denunciation, or in more violent expressions of anger.

The question of giving voice to this feeling entails a political dimension. If in the hands of Nietzsche and Scheler, resentment becomes a degrading emotion that betrays the unworthiness of those who embody it, Hume and Smith had considered a condition of justice that those who had suffered offence experienced resentment and made us feel it. Throughout the 20th century resentment has been associated to the question of how to make visible this suffering – whether it was associated to a past humiliation and hidden in the form of trauma, or an injury present in daily life but hidden from political representation (Sennet and Cobb, 1972).

When the humiliation is not atrocious (as in the historical cases of slavery, shoa, or the brutal repression of those defeated in the Spanish Civil War), then the experience of suffering is relative to a culture that presents as legitimate a series of aspirations, whereas the dynamics of society do not allow certain groups to achieve them. Robert Merton (1938) and Walter Runciman (1966) used the term relative deprivation to refer to this distressful feeling. Many cases of 20th century resentment as lived by the inhabitants of western democracies in periods of peace involve a feeling of relative deprivation accompanied with actual experiences of mistreatment. Resentment is here related not as much to a past offence, as to a present and a future of unfulfilled expectations. How to deal with this suffering and what expression is most suitable for it has been a common concern around the situation of the working classes at least throughout the two thirds of the century.

Following Boltanski’s (1999) analytic distinction between denunciation and compassion, I focus on two different representations of the working class in the 20th century: the workers photographic movement of the 1920s and 1930s and a series of sociological works of the 1960s and 1970s that emphasised the suffering of the working classes in daily life. The first put the accent on physical suffering, connected to a situation of exhausting work and a life of economic privation. Many of these photographs also create comparisons showing other social groups that, living in the same town, enjoy a world of richness. The sociological works of the 1960s and 1970s shift to a narration in which the “unpleasant and painful inner visceral sensations”, as Scheler put it, are verbalised. These two forms of representation, which try to create a link between the individual bodies and the social states (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1994) show how fragile the line between denunciation and tender-heartedness compassion can be. When the suffering of a group is emphasised, there is an inflation of sentiments that can lead to immobilise both the victims (Antze and Lambeck, 1996) and the observers. On the other hand, a narrative of suffering and resentment can play a fundamental role in the constitution of a collective identity, as it has been common ground for ethnic minorities (Eyerman, 2004). This latter option, however, is hardly available to “the working class”, as it lacks a founding narration, a mythical past associated to the persecution of a
particular cultural group. The transformation of their suffering in indignation depends necessarily on investigation that can identify the persecutor – in other words, the active cause of their situation.

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Max Scheler’s Analysis of Ressentiment in Modern Democracies.

Scheler’s study about Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralität (“The Ressentiment in the Construction of Moralities”, 1912), translated into English under the simplified title Ressentiment (2nd ed., Marquette University Press, 1994), defines ressentiment as a violation and distortion of the order of value-feeling. Normally, Scheler holds, values are evident objects of intentional feeling and are orderly related to each other, in a way which can be described in terms of an immutable a priori hierarchy, consisting in four independent levels: the lowest value modality is that of sensible values (agreeable/disagreeable); next comes the modality of vital values (noble/vulgar); the next higher rank are spiritual values (aesthetic: beautiful/ugly; juridic: right/wrong; cognitive: true/false); finally and highest we find the values of holiness (holy/unholy). The moral values “good” and “evil” appear in acts of realizing respectively positive and negative values on each of these levels; and in acts of choosing and realizing respectively a value of a higher or lower level. This order, given in the intuitive evidence of preference, is “an absolute ethic reference system, on the background of which all moral judgements, norms, variation of ethos and moralities in history take place” (M. Frings).

Ressentiment is one of the sources of historical variations of the rules of preference, as Nietzsche already pointed out. According to Scheler, it consists in a comparison between different levels of values, in such a way that the values of higher levels are sought to be pulled down to lower levels (value detraction), or that the nature of lower values is injected into that of higher range values. Scheler’s analysis includes some statements about collective aspects of ressentiment in Western democratic societies:

(1) The causes of the accumulation of ressentiment in individuals and groups have to be sought in a social structure that combines equality of rights with inequality of facts (situations, wealth, etc). The present contribution links this analysis to the more comprehensive reflection developed by Scheler on the relationship between democracy and equality, especially in Der Geist und die ideellen Grundlagen der Demokratien der großen Nationen (“The Spirit and the Ideal Foundations of Democracies in the Great Nations”; 1916; translated neither into English nor into French), in order to understand that ressentiment is not a consequence of social inequalities as such, but merely of a specific combination of inequality and equality, linked to the unawareness of the hierarchy of values. This unawareness results in preferring the value of usefulness to those of life, and in the assumption that moral value only belongs to that which is quantifiable and calculable, i.e. to utility. The main question is that of the value ranges concerned by the claim of equality; Scheler consistently argues in favour of a social order where low ranking (i.e. utility and sensible) values are equally distributed, while distribution should be increasingly unequal as the concerned value modalities are higher. He thus holds a position exactly opposite to the thought of Enlightenment, which claimed for equal personal, civil and political rights, at the cost of the equality of factual power, economic possessions, etc.

(2) Our modern societies favour the development of ressentiment because of the principle of rivalry and competition on which the market economy rests. The word “capitalism” in Scheler’s work is an attitude of consciousness rather than a political-economical concept. The assessment concerning the genesis of capitalism is the following: (a) a peculiar form of value comparison generates the characterological type of the pusher; (b) the social preponderance of pushing leads to the socio-economic system of competition, which induces unlimited needs, and where goods that are likely to satisfy desires are first treated as merchandise (as Marx already pointed out). As a result, consumer society exhausts itself in a paradox: the increasingly massive and fast production of goods intended for the enjoyment comes along with a decrease of the human capacity for enjoyment. It is shown how these analyses find resonance among economists from John Maynard Keynes (Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, 1930) to Patrick Viveret (Reconsidérer la richesse [“Reconsidering Wealth”], 2002) and are likely to shed some light upon the most urgent problems of our time.
The concept of resentment has been explored extensively in the fields of philosophy, social sciences and psychology. Less critical attention has been paid to it from the point of view of historical medicine. Resentment is understood as the repeated experiencing and re-living of hostile emotional response reactions against someone else; it is a re-experiencing of the emotion itself which gradually pervades the core of the personality and becomes a generalized experience of suppressed wrath, hostility and hatred largely independent of the activity of the ego that inspires numerous specific hostile intentions. In addition, resentment has a social factor; it is connected with the comparisons which we make between one and another (Masterson, 1979).

This presentation examines the role of resentment in the School of psychosomatic medicine, as developed in United States between 1930 and 1960. The physicians of this school attempted to combine the organic-physiological aspects of illness and the theories of Freud. The psychosomatic approach meant a re-thinking of the mind-body dichotomy, it launched the psychological mechanism as the cause of illness and underlined the role emotions play in somatic illnesses.

We shall refer to Franz Alexander (1891-1964), Helen Flandes Dunbar (1902-1959), Irving D. Harris, etc. Even though their approaches and methodology were different, they were connected through Psychosomatic Medicine, the official peer-reviewed journal of American Psychosomatic Society, (established in 1939 and still being published). Over the years we are interested in, 1930 to 1960, we find that resentment is a recurring issue which appears in many articles in the journal. Most of these articles we will consider deal with cases and patient tales which show the etiopathogenic theories and therapeutic aspects of the doctor-patient relationship.

Specifically, the presentation aims to study how resentment was defined from the medical perspective. We will study the introduction of resentment into the psychogenesis of the symptoms, and in the pathologies and diseases with which this emotion was associated. Finally, we will study the repercussions of resentment in the 2 therapeutic approach suggested by the American school, as resentment leads to a pathologicalization of the doctor-patient relationship which is fundamental in psychosomatic treatment.

According to theories of psychosomatic medicine, the physical changes that usually accompany emotions are transitory, but they do produce physical alterations, which can lead to functional disturbances, particularly when the influence of emotions is enduring.

We know, for instance, of cases of so-called "conversion hysteria" within psychoanalysis. The condition appears when a person tries to restrain long-term and repressed emotions (Alexander, 1939), as in the case of resentment. At least initially, the American Psychosomatic School noted that each emotion was related specifically to an organic disorder or disease (Alexander, 1950). The debate was soon broadened to include the influence of the emotions on other ailments which were defined as functional, due to the absence of an organic basis for their form. Thus began the debate on the relationship between resentment and other negatively-considered emotions, and the origin of certain organic or functional disorders. Some physicians, for example Irving D Harris, claimed that resentment would appear in both types of ailment, but above all in gastric disorders. Others associated this emotion with discomforts such as headache, back-ache or joint pain, which at the time were all considered “functional disorders”.

We shall also see that, in medicine, consideration of resentment was linked to greater consideration of the subjective aspects of the health and illness of the patient and those connected with “a maximization of the welfare attainable through available technology”. The psychosomatic therapeutic proposal of the American psychosomatic school stressed the healing nature of the doctor-patient relationship. According to Alexander, it was psychosomatic medicine that allowed the art of medicine to be considered scientific medicine. From that moment on –he stated– “the influence of the doctor-patient bond could no longer be considered a mere addendum to the treatment, an artistic or personal touch, but rather the main basic therapeutic factor” (1939). The therapy, in the case of a process caused by resentment is based on what might be called the principle of “corrective emotional experience” (Alexander, 1946, 112). Helen Dunbar says something similar: “The physician's responsibility is to correct intraorganic dysfunction, but often this is possible only when he becomes the catalytic agent in restoring the patient's capacity for integration in society” (1953, 685). 3

But the doctor-patient relationship, itself, can be an object of resentment, since this emotion is defined by its interpersonal character. Resentment expresses the repetition of a hostile emotional response from either the doctor or the patient. H. Dunbar believes that when the doctor is no longer capable of communicating properly with the patient, s/he becomes a “pathogenic agent”, as s/he causes anxiety and fear and thus aggravates the state of the patient.
This particular relationship is therefore part of the pathology of the physician-patient relationship which includes resentment together with deception and seduction. (Freeling, 1982). The studies connect the pathologization of the doctor-patient relationship with processes of chronic suffering or attention. Moreover, the authors differentiate between the ways in which resentment appears depending on the type of disorder or ailment. Thus, for example, the study on the Doctor-Patient Relationship carried out by means of Projective Techniques by M Thaler, H Weiner and Morton F. Reiser (1957) states that in disorders such as arterial hypertension or gastric ulcers the patients use the doctor's inability to cure them as a platform for resentment and provocation. But they also state that there are differences between these two groups of patients. In the former, the origin of this resentment is real, while in the peptic ulcer group it is based on fantasy. In both cases, these conflicts are dependency related (as is the doctor-patient relationship) and give rise to hostile impulses that lead to the development of defence mechanisms in the formation and establishment of relationships.

In short, from a social and ethical-philosophical perspective, it has been said that some emotions such as guilt, resentment, shame and anger may have a special role in the establishment of a range of “response-dependent” values and norms that that lie at the core of moral life. Here we will show that one of the repercussions of the psychosomatic period was the significance attained by the emotional factor in medicine, which led to emphasis on the importance of communication or the consideration of social-environmental factors, and contributed to the reshaping of the relationships between doctors and patients.

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Turning Brothers into Enemies? Resentment in Atlantic Revolutions.

Emotional categories are historical constructions. In History, some emotions have been related to “primitives”, others to “civilized” peoples. By means of explanation, we can argue there is even a connection between certain emotions and the so-called –in different periods, in different manners- “spirits of the age”. That is, a social acceptance of certain emotions and a refusal of others. This adaptation of a category –anger, fear, happiness, resentment- to a concrete context can afford important explanations to what the emotions “are” and what in fact “represent”. The study of emotions in the Eighteenth Century can give us a glimpse of the transition from Ancien régime to modern societies and individuals. The role of resentment is a key issue in this debate, because the idea of political revolution was invented at that time. At least in the Western World, change only could be obtained until that century of Enlightenment by means of reform, a restoration of old virtues, the only moral values that could be imagined. World was perfect as such, as created by God. Everybody was given a place at birth and it was for ever. Social mobility was related to the acceptance of rules. Revolts, jacqueries, mutinies were, first and utmost, an offence against nature, an act of madness, although explanation and remedy through mercy of kings and queens could sometimes arrive, once the restoration of order had been achieved. But by 1700 the so-called “Battle of the books” in England, the “Querelle” in France, or the “novatores” in Spain, changed once and for all the discussion about the meaning of political virtues. If the preeminence of the Ancient Greeks and Romans over the “people of an enlightened age” was not accepted, tradition was not venerated. Ancients were not wiser than Moderns. And the imitation of classics was not the only way to establish a fair political regime. In a sudden, something really new could be imagined and the political meaning of revolution to destroy monarchies and republics was conceivable. In this context, resentment was a key element conveying a credible explanation of the justice and opportunity of its cause. From then on, resentment conveys individuality, built up public opinions, or expresses a moral economy of modern multitudes. Resentment explains revolution; it works as a self-fulfilling prophecy. But it must be taken into account generalizations are difficult. In the age of Atlantic revolutions, from the independence of United States in 1776 to the French Revolution in 1789, the Haitian Revolution and the foundation of the first “Black republic of the world” there in 1804, or the independence of Portuguese and Spanish America, concluded in 1824, very different resentments were at work. To begin with, in the Ancien régime there was a channel to express resentment without breaking the rules. The “memorial of grievances” expressed the break of the social contract by certain unfair rulers, turned into despots. In certain conditions, as in some Jesuit political treaties, like that of father Mariana, it could be justified the assassination of a king. The declaration of the independence of United States is a memorial of grievances and sufferings of the colonists under the government of the unfair king George III. Rebellion was organized and justified to make justice. But there was nothing new; the king had broken the contract, the Atlantic constitution of the British Empire. So in the end political independence was gained in 1783, but the virtuous foundation of a republic of planters and traders did not affect the social model. On the contrary, it was reinforced. The French revolution was a different matter; strong social issues were in the agenda. As Marc Ferro recently pointed out, between 1789 and 1793 the revolution was against the king, against the aristocrats, against the rich. Violence and revenge were justified by resentment, an emotion in principle appropriated by revolutionaries, and then by those opposed to changes. The
Haitian case was different because on the other side of the Atlantic ethnicity was a key element; 85% of the population of Saint-Domingue in 1790 were slaves. Resentment could not explain anything, because nothing was in need of explanation for rebel slaves—or its masters-. Social mobility did not exist in proper sense, although there was a small group of free mulattoes. Finally, resentment in the revolutions of independence of Spanish and Portuguese America worked as a combination of political and social issues. On the one hand, it served the creole elites to explain and justify a rebellion against the kings and the monarchies due to supposedly postponements and injustices. On the other, it served mixed races, free blacks, slaves and poor whites, to convey their political aspirations to social and not only political changes.

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Thatcher and Blunt: Class and Resentment in Twentieth Century British History.

Satirists have long characterised the Margaret Thatcher who arrived in Downing Street to become UK Prime Minister in 1979 as someone with a strong strain of resentment against the political establishment and polite society as a whole. According to the novelist Sue Townsend, who ten years later compiled the fictional diaries of Margaret’s thirteen year-old self for her True Confessions of Adrian Albert Mole, Margaret Hilda Roberts and Susan Lilian Townsend (1989), “She walked alone and friendless to school and back […] She took these early experiences with her to Downing Street and had her revenge.” Yet, at the same time, conventional descriptions of the so-called ‘Iron Lady’ (many of which, such as the autobiographical passages in Thatcher’s Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (2002), originate in her own heroic self-image), characterise her as a figure of emotional equilibrium, a Machiavellian paragon of politics and international relations. Such accounts tend to see Thatcher in hindsight through the prism of ‘Thatcherism’ and its political certainties, whether in a positive light or, as in texts such as Peter Jenkins’ Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era (1987), in terms of a master-plan to crush the ‘working class’ of industrial labour and elevate the marketplace world of her own youth as a small-town grocer’s daughter. Looking closely at the upwardly-mobile class politics of her life has already helped to generate a more complex portrait of her emotional biography, however; one in which her emotional control feeds off and at the same time aggravates her feelings of resentment. In John Campbell’s magisterial two volume Margaret Thatcher (2003), her compulsive appetite for enemies means she figuratively ‘eats up’ those she resents and their cultures and institutions, moving decisively (or maybe desperately) from feast to feast; from civil service to universities, from council housing to the BBC and independent television. Naming the respected art historian and Keeper of the Queen’s Pictures Sir Anthony Blunt (1907-1983) as a Soviet spy in November 1979, a handful of months into her first term of office, perhaps represents an early example of this desire to confront the power of, from her perspective, an alien world. Blunt represented a certain class background; that is to say, the complacent, privileged upper class of the public schools and Oxbridge, who controlled many of the public institutions which Thatcher sought to reform. It should be pointed out that Thatcher, who remarked to reporters on becoming Prime Minister that “it is passionately interesting for me that the things I learned in a small town, in a very modest home, are just the things that I believe have won the election”, to some extent inhabited the mental universe of Jane Austen novel whose marginalised middle classes meet, and struggle with feelings of inferiority to, the lordly manors (and manners) of the local aristocracy. From the aristocratic point of view, classically, the humbleness of Thatcher’s own background in provincial Grantham might be looked down upon as a sign of her ill-breeding and insignificance; and such a social consciousness certainly had some residual significance within the post-war Conservative Party. Her political career within the Party had made her acutely aware of her beginnings, her rivalry with Edward Heath revolving around her unease with his cultural accomplishments, and her political credibility growing with the voice training she undertook before becoming Prime Minister, to eradicate her dull Midlands vowels and acquire the sharper, more cut-glass accent of the respectable lady. These issues of social identity and social performance, which coalesced in the Blunt episode, tell us a great deal about the social politics of resentful emotion at a crucial juncture in twentieth century British and European history.
Resentment as an Emotion Regulation Strategy in International Politics: The Lebanese-Syrian Relationship.

Resentment lies at the heart of world politics. Indeed, the international system is characterized by an anarchic structure and, as a consequence, by power struggles. This particular feature of world politics has several implications in terms of disparities and status hierarchy (Smouts, Battistella, Vennesson, 2006: 470). The imbalanced structure of the international system can generate anger, feeling of unfairness, frustration, and envy. At the same time, the “international community” – a moving set of identities and norms – constrains to some extent the emotional experiences of decision-makers. Thus, in my case study, Lebanese political leaders could not, for material and moral reasons, « react » (in the Nietzschean sense) to pain and humiliation following thirty years of Syrian occupation and the 2005 murder of the charismatic Sunni leader, Rafic Hariri. Resentment provides the ability to cope with the stimulus event while lowering its negative impact on psycho-physiological well-being (Lazarus, Folkman, 1984: 196).

Political resentment is the pain experienced in reaction to an offense or a humiliation which lasts through its memory. It provokes a revenge desire against those who are considered to be responsible for the wrong suffered. Finally, resentful political actors cannot fully express their anger because they are unable to undertake a genuine action. Functional mechanisms of resentment then allow, through retaliatory and, most of time, symbolic measures, to keep a mental balance. Resentment reduces anger and pain intensity through cognitive and emotional processes. As a result, vengeful policies are strategies to cope with threatening events. However, resentment is usually linked with danger and hostility. It looks like a “perverted desire of revenge” (Zizek, 2008) and it is associated with extreme displays of violence (Scheff, 1994; Petersen, 2002; Burrin, 2004). However, in some cases and under specific circumstances, resentment can stop fierce, heated, and destructive emotions. In other terms, the paper rejects an entirely negative vision of resentment, arguing that at times it can prevent violent conflicts. By relying on emotion regulation theory and the concept of coping, the paper sustains a balanced view of resentment in world politics (Gross, 2007). Resentment introduces a secondary appraisal in order to match socially satisfactory emotional behavior (Luminet, 2008: 217). Moreover, resentment is a social emotion which often translates a pain which comes from the re-consideration of an emotional attachment. From this perspective, the Syrian government, deeply humiliated by the ashamed circumstances of its retreat and the sudden reconsideration of its « big brother » (Bachar el-Assad’s quotation) status vis-à-vis Lebanon, has applied revenge politics toward its neighbor. The economic blockade at the Syrian-Lebanese border during the summer 2005, the massive gunrunning, and the burning statements are just a few examples of retaliation measures which were deployed with the purpose to punish Lebanon for its behavior.

This paper aims at establishing a model for analysis of political resentment in international relations against the backdrop of the Lebanese-Syrian case. Following the lineage of Petersen, it is argued that, in addition to the micro-psychological foundations of individual resentment, the macro-structural context matters as well. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Lebanese-Syrian history has been in fact marked by “a tormented combination of attraction and repulsion, of love and hate” (Seal in Chaitani, 2007: IX). This paradoxical situation has generated resentful developments. The paper is organized into three sections. The first presents the theoretical model of political resentment in international relations. The second shows how and under which circumstances resentment precludes high intensity violence. The last one demonstrates the way in which resentment has acted in the Lebanese-Syrian history and it has affected their relationship. The resentment presence and its influence are analyzed with the help of historical data, analysis of political discourse and interviews which have been carried out with Lebanese and Syrian political leaders.

To Take Ill”: Resentment in Eighteenth-Century Context.

This paper seeks to explore the representation of the emotion of resentment within an eighteenth-century British context. It begins with a short lexicographical survey that looks at definitions in early-modern dictionaries (dictionaries that precede and in some ways lead to Johnson’s definitive work) in order to determine the differences in meaning between the late seventeenth and the eighteenth century. This overview reveals that the concept of resentment undergoes a change, and from a wider and more neutral conception becomes specifically and more emphatically tied to injury and anger. Although often used as synonyms, anger and resentment differ in subtle but essential ways. The paper draws on the ethical
discourse on anger of the time, and argues that because resentment is connected to ‘settled and deliberate’
anger and not ‘hasty and sudden’ anger, it is effectively dissociated from the definition of anger as ‘short
madness’. Thus, resentment bears a distinct relation to reasonableness. Moreover, modifications of
resentment as in ‘just resentment’ reveal also a connection to morality. Resentment in a morally justifiable
state (raised against moral wrong) is discussed in one of the most important ethical writings of the early
eighteenth century; Joseph Butler’s Fifteen Sermons. However, the same discussion also warns of
resentment being a set disposition, unforgiving of injuries and akin to revenge and malice. These regards
of reasonableness, morality and forgiveness that pertain to instances of resentment reveal a lot about the
relationship of the offender to the offended party, the nature of the injury and also the propriety or not of
expressing resentment. Drawing on these premises, the discussion then focuses on advice concerning
resentment and instances of it in a variety of sources such as conduct books, a compilation and guide to
letter writing that presents ‘cards of resentment’ as a social exchange, a story published in The Adventurer,
a periodical of moral focus, and finally one of the most influential works of domestic fiction of the time;
Richardson’s Clarissa. The cases presented offer justification both for repression of resentment as
beneficial to one’s social prosperity and for the expression of resentment in order to sustain that
entitlement to social dignity that is signified by the word ‘honour’. In this way, they reveal that beyond the
spontaneity of an emotional response, intricate considerations determine the states of either ‘stifling one’s
resentment’ or ‘taking something ill’.

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The shadows of Ourselves: The Material Expression of Resentment.

This presentation takes Adam Smith’s Theory of moral sentiments, as the starting point to discuss the
material expression of emotions, or even vicarious emotions, in the field of the new Humanities. Though
the connection between emotions and expressions is not univocal or immediate, that does not mean that
history, or political science for that matter, can do without taking into consideration the forms that
subjective experiences have acquired in the sciences, in the literature or in the arts. In this case, I will
propose a reading of one of the most famous paintings of Théodore Géricault, Le radeau de la Méduse, as
an exemplification of political and moral resentment. Unlike similar works of art, intended to enhance the
viewer’s approval towards the figure of the “benefactor”, Géricault’s work, which sympathizes with the
hatred of the victims towards the perpetrators of their misfortune, aims at public resentment rather than
compassion; it conveys an implicit accusation and a craving for justice.

The historian Lynn Hunt is right to connect the invention of human rights with the cultural processes of
empathic identification that proliferated during the second half of the eighteenth century. Many of these
processes are framed in a “politics of compassion;” the result of kindness towards the wretched of the
world, understood en masse, with no distinction among them and with no reference to the reason that
initially converted them into victims. She is wrong, however, to consider that the impartiality of the
observer depends only on identification or mimesis. In the works of Burke or Smith, sympathy is not given
under the form of empathy or emotional contagion, but through an imagination that is at the same time
performative and reflexive. The observer not only dreams, but also judges; she does not only look, but also
determines the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of others. More important still, she does not only
reflexively identify with what she sees, but also with what might have happened, or with that which,
against all evidence, cannot happen nor will ever happen. It is only through this fantasy that mimesis is
transformed into a potentially universal and virtually just emotion; only in this counterfactual way of
experiencing the pain of others can the observer reach sufficient distance to construct a universal position
– one that is just in its evaluation and general in its sphere of application.

Unlike a politics of pity, based on immediate identification with the person who suffers, the “politics of
justice” cannot do without the enunciation of tragedy. Here observation is linked to verbal or visual
expression because the observer is not there only to look, but also to report. The observer’s expository
capacity transcends her (subjective) emotion and explains her (objective) desire to provide a historical
record. In his detailed study of distant suffering, the sociologist Luc Boltanski identifies three expository
forms that, with all their historical variations, serve to account for the spectacle of violence. The first two,
he tells us, may take the form of accusation or philanthropy. The first, accusation, stems from the idea, as
old as Humanity itself, that it is easier to construct a moral system when an agreement is reached as to
who is directly responsible for the evil being denounced. In this case, the observer not only looks on but
also condemns. In the second, on the other hand, where sympathy toward benefactors is greater than
hatred toward executioners, the action is directed toward philanthropy rather than toward revenge. In the
third, enunciative form, which I will attribute to Géricault, the observer cannot be drawn toward denouncement nor does she succumb to sentimentality. On the contrary, he keeps his gaze steady in the face of horror and does not blink in the face of truth. In the world in which we live, nothing seems stranger than this connection between what we call today the sphere of aesthetics and the world of politics.

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Synthetic Rancours.

This lecture deals with an episode involving the relationships between emotions and wars. Since the poet converted the rage of Achilles into a symbol of the Trojan War, emotions have formed a part of wartime stories. Without going back so far in time, this conference will try to characterize one special emotion: rancour. An emotion that has gained prominence progressively in the conflicts that have afflicted Europe since the French Revolution, and which emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, and that was fed by all the resentment that the successful isms of the century brought about.

Wars have always needed emotional stimulus. Without a doubt some were represented by the nobleness of the hero, or by the altruism of those that died young or by the love towards one’s country represented by the dictum dulce et decorum est pro patria mori or the less subtle everything for my country. Nevertheless, if these emotions were enough to sustain wars in the not too distant past, which is very doubtful indeed, they were not sufficient to sustain the state of wars that arose, at least from the beginning of the 20th century. The War of 1914, called “The Great” because it required the mobilization of special resentments, in the form of extreme or rancours. The problem with emotions that sustain the spirit to keep fighting is that this state of emotions can be short-lived, and take the shape of transitory states of mind. All of the civil societies involved in the conflict of 1914 knew that it was or convenient to maintain the resentments and rancours continuously, from before the outbreak of war until after victory is achieved, because wars are followed by other wars with a constant regularity.

How this was achieved is the object of this lecture. This problem often is dealt with by supposing that the procedure was to let grow the underlying resentment of any group towards that which is different, as a generator of aggression, and converting it into an enemy. This point of view considers that individuals have natural resentments that resonate during conflicts, in a way analogous to how Goethe explained the dynamics of elective affinities. According to this point of view, the processes that cultivated resentment in the societies at the beginning of the 20th century only needed the catalysis of propaganda to form the necessary rancour in order to sustain and justify, even with joy, such bloody conflicts.

In this lecture the idea will be defended that this point of view is not only incomplete, but that it is very naïve. In this article the idea will defended that since the beginning of the 20th century the forms of growing emotions to sustain the conflicts followed different dynamics, from the one described above. Resentments did not resonate in a natural way. Emotional chemistry did not follow the pattern established by the old theory of affinities. The chemistry of our era gives us better information in order to understand the strategy that was followed. In the same way that the concept of Ersatz was brought about in chemical production, a type of Ersatz was developed for emotions. The chemical industry considered a radical breakthrough being able to substitute natural components (always very scarce) by synthetic ones, and by which mass industrial production changed the relationships between industries and the societies that would later enter into war. In an analogous way this occurred with emotions, which are so necessary to unite societies in conflict, but are always too scarce and often decidedly esthetic. It became necessary to replace natural emotions with synthetic ones, an emotional Ersatz that could implant mass-produced rancours for the masses. These synthetic resentments had to be of the best quality to insure not only the emergence of the war of 1914 but of the subsequent wars. That this was achieved is evident, considering the development of the conflicts of the 20th century and their typology. This lecture will try to unravel how this Ersatz, which was one of the most eloquent mass emotional processes of the century, came to be.

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Nietzsche “First Psychologist” and the Genealogy of Ressentiment.

Why in Nietzsche's thought priests and slaves are overwhelmed by the emotional dynamics of resentment? What kind of relationship can we seize between Nietzsche's reworking of this notion and their original literary sources? As the keystone of Nietzsche's deconstruction of morality, the mechanism of resentment displays, beyond external appearances, the strikes of a universal moralizing law making "a second nature of the mistrust of instincts". From a double theoretical and terminological point of view, we will try to clarify the role of
resentment in Nietzsche's psychological approach—referring to his self-definition of "first psychologist" in the history of philosophy—and in his conception of emotions, in relation to Darwin's theory of evolution and to Nietzsche's notions of "physiology" and "aristocracy.

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In contemporary Papua New Guinea, the question of whether and how indigenous practices, beliefs and values have changed from pre-colonial to post-colonial times has become a source of interest for anthropologists. Following Sahlins (1992), anthropological work on the emotions, specifically humiliation and resentment, has found a new lease of life through ethnographies on Papua New Guinea concerned with questions of socio-cultural change (c.f. Robbins and Wardlow 2005). I draw on such work and my own fieldwork in Goroka in order focus on women and children's intimate and kin relationships to argue that resentment is a crucial motivation and framework for their actions; that seemingly 'insignificant' or 'trivial' moments in one's personal life can unintentionally contribute to wider social change. One potentially unintended consequence of resentment in intimate relationships is social change in the form of disrupted socio-cultural reproduction. In many anthropological depictions of Papua New Guinea, kinship is the medium through which broader socio-cultural reproduction occurs. Birth, marriage and death are the reasons for, and mode through which, socio-economic exchange is conducted, political relationships are lived, and meaningful social values generated. To change kinship is thus to change whether and how socio-cultural reproduction can take place. Arguably, this is happening in Goroka where 'customary' marriage practices and sexual reproduction are increasingly decoupled from one another by the prevalence of pre and extra-marital sex and prostitution. Writing of the Huli of the Southern Highlands, Wardlow has observed that promiscuous sexuality (in the form of prostitution) 'threatens human history as the Huli conceptualize it, which is primarily in genealogical terms: it suggests the possibility of a world in which women are no longer exchanged, valuables are no longer distributed, affines are no longer created, and [due to the logic of patrilineal descent] the identities of children become indefinite.' (2006: 151, parenthesis added).

Resentment must be acknowledged as a key (although not sole) motivation for these types of sex. In Goroka, anger and resentment harboured towards one's parents, partner, or partner's parents rather than sexual desire, were frequently cited as the trigger for one's adultery or promiscuity. Again, Wardlow (2004, 2006) observes that it is anger, disappointment and resentment towards one's fathers and brothers that drives women to prostitution: unwilling for their male kin to profit from bridewealth that would be paid on their marriage, women decide to 'ruin themselves' through removing themselves from social reproduction. In both cases, women's decisions and the resentment that motivates them, turn on a culturally specific mode of personhood and emotionality. Yet, despite cultural models of and for the emotions, it also became clear to me during fieldwork that certain forms of resentment and anger cannot be articulated or read in existing socio-cultural frameworks for the emotions as 'socially legitimate'. Initial resentment, coupled with resentment and frustration at being excluded from existing avenues of expression, has led women and children to seek out non-indigenous state institutions (district courts and the police). They do so in order to exact revenge or inflict hurt on those men that they could otherwise struggle to challenge, those men that had caused their initial feelings of resentment.

In making my arguments, I draw on ethnographic examples from my fieldwork to revisit traditional themes of anthropological interest: social reproduction, kinship and marriage. However, in approaching the social relationships these involve in terms of intimacy and the emotions, I depart from traditional approaches that view such relationships in terms of structure, practice, norm or their socio-cultural productivity. Furthermore, I explore the implications of resentment in social change on theories of personhood that suggest that Melanesian and 'Western' models of personhood are radically different, indeed, incommensurable.
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The Color of rust. The “Rancor” of Ripa as a Source of Modern Resentment.

The voice “Rancor”, present in the first Roman edition without images of 1593 of the Cesare Ripa’s Iconology, unexpectedly fails to appear in the subsequent editions supplied with images in the two following centuries in Italian, English and French language. However, that first description is so vivid that its visualization results immediately in the reader’s mind.

Compared to the description contained in the sixteenth-century edition both this edition than the following allow to highlight the meaning of all the iconographic attributes mentioned by Ripa, searching for them in icons with similar meanings (Anger, Rage, Sloth), or whenever in another icon have been used the same iconographic attributes (the bear, the rust-red dress, the flames, the snake, the sword...).

Ripa describes the causes and the outcomes of the rancor going through the description of the status of the rancorous subject (pallor, pain, thinness, plagued sole by fistulas and poisons that infects it), between the individual situation and the social back-falls of such feeling.

A biblical narration and a Roman history episode, somehow connected, are mentioned as examples of rancor, but not the Greek tragedy, full of figures animated by resentment, as you could expect.

A well-known precedent is the Rancor painted by Sandro Botticelli inside the Calunnia of 1496; there are no similarities between the iconologist’s description and the painter’s figure, except from the point of view of the contents, because Botticelli put the rancor personification before a judge willing to listen (some reference to the courts exists in the Ripa’s Rancor).

The paper sounds out deeply the Ripa’s icon of Rancor and after more than four hundred years supplies it of the representation made for the occasion of the workshop by a contemporary artist. This representation, which accompanies the text in the publication, is painted by Magda Milano, Professor of Painting at the Accademia di Belle Arti in Lecce (Italy).

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French Resentment and the Brutalization of the German During the First World War (1914-1918).

Any war has a powerful emotional content, but the emotions that every conflict raises are not always the same. This is why recent scholarship of the First World War has tried to clarify the role that certain emotional experiences played in the development of the conflict [Roper, 2009]. Among the cultural factors that led to the First World War, traditional historiography has pointed out the enthusiasm of the young boys [Mosse, 1990; Adams, 1990]. According to the “Myth of the War Experience” described by Mosse, the war “gave a new meaning to life and made it worthwhile” because the military activity was regarded as the possibility of a personal development towards a more masculine, stronger man [Mosse, 1990, p. 25]. In the case of France, this possibility of regeneration had different nuances. The French context was still dominated by the memories of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, when France was defeated by the German army and, as a result, lost the regions of Alsace and Lorraine. Thus, this new war was generally felt as the best occasion of revenge.

Following the main researches in history of emotions [Ferro, 2007; Hardin & Pribran, 2009] this paper explores how enthusiasm and resentment intersected and become powerful tools for the French national propaganda. Both the press and the literature encouraged those emotions and even turned them into the justification of the French fight. Thus, my aim is to analyse how these emotions were constructed by the patriotic rhetoric and the visual representations, as well as to examine the evolution of their role during the war.

I claim that enthusiasm and, especially, resentment were so relevant in the justification of the fight because they shaped the image of the German as barbarian, animal people. This proposal will examine the photographic representations of the German soldiers in the illustrated press like L’Illustration and other visual sources. In particular, the focus will be on two kinds of photographs: the images showing the “German atrocities”, in particular the violence made to the civilians, and the prisoners interned on the French camps.

On the one hand, I will analyze the brutalization of the German soldiers through the representation of their reprehensible actions. The photographs of the bombarded cities and plundered villages aimed to reinforce the “Myth of the German atrocities”. This was forged on 1914 as a result of the German actions during the invasion of Belgium, and was intended to project a dehumanized image of the enemy [Horne & Kramer, 2001]. Within this myth, the German soldiers were presented as violent people able to commit any crime in order to achieve their objective. In this way, the destroyed houses were presented as the consequence of their criminal actions, what was used by the French propaganda in order to increase the feelings of revenge.
On the other hand, I will examine the animalization of the German soldiers through the representation of the prisoners captured after the battles. Propagandistic albums such as *La Guerre* or *La Bataille de Champagne* remarked their disgusting physical appearance and their immoral attitudes, which were presented as the evidences of their animal character [*La Guerre*, 1916]. Thus, these bodies weakened by the war were supposed to materialize the worse qualities of the German people. As these were the opposite of the supposedly French qualities, these images encouraged the French population to continue the war. They could be excited about the idea of the destruction of the German people, which represented the degeneration of the human race.

In conclusion, this paper claims that the photographic representations of the German soldiers as brutal people served to justify the French fight because they were the result of the French politics of resentment and military enthusiasm. But these photographs also configured the new meanings given to these emotions during the war by means of the scenes they presented and the contexts in which they appeared. Hence, this proposal deals not only with the question of the political effects of emotions, but also, and especially, with the cultural construction of those emotions through certain practices, discourses and images.

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*Responsibility, Resentment and Response-Dependence.*

It certainly appears natural to feel a number of negative emotions about your neighbour when you discover that he purposely trampled on your flowering tulips. Indeed, most would agree that there is a tight connection between emotions such as resentment and indignation and responsibility attributions. This paper aims at clarifying the relation between responsibility and emotions, and in particular resentment. According to Strawsonian accounts, which have been prominent in the 20th century, someone is responsible just if reactive attitudes, i.e. attitudes such as resentment, indignation or gratitude, towards that person are appropriate (Strawson 1962; Wallace 1994; Fischer & Ravizza 1998).

One important question to assess such accounts is what reactive attitudes are. Thus, the first section of the paper focuses on the nature of resentment and on the relation between resentment and moral judgements. Drawing on a broadly cognitive theory of emotions, which emphasises the analogies between emotions and perceptions, I argue that resentment has cognitive content (see Tappolet 2000; Tappolet forthcoming). Even though it is possible to feel resentment towards someone while judging that he has done nothing wrong – maybe he is just child, or else he had no choice but to do what he did – resentment is closely tied to moral judgement. When feeling resentment at someone, we tend to judge that what he has done is wrong. More generally, resentment is plausibly taken to be a kind of perception of moral features. Though occasionally misleading, such moral perceptions nonetheless play a crucial epistemic role with respect to our moral beliefs.

The next section explores the implication of this view for Strawsonian accounts. The problem is that such accounts generally presuppose a non-cognitive conception of emotions, in which an emotion like resentment is merely taken to express a subjective make-up rather than reflecting a cognitive ability (see for instance Bennett 1980). There are versions of Strawsonian accounts, such as the one proposed by Jay Wallace (1994), which resist non-cognitivism. However, the problem is that they raise the question of why an emotion like resentment should be taken to be essential to responsibility, given that resentment is claimed to presuppose moral judgement.

The last section discusses whether or not emotions nonetheless play an important role in our responsibility attributions. It will be argued that emotions are more than just a habitual accompaniment to our responsibility attributions. The suggestion that will be made is that emotions come into the picture because of a particular feature of responsibility attributions: their involvement with evaluative judgements. What agents are responsible for are actions that are assessed in evaluative terms, such as good and bad. Given this, it is to be expected that emotions have an important role to play. The claim that will be defended is the following: If a negative emotion, say, is appropriate with respect to someone given what he or she has freely and knowingly done, this is because the action is bad. In such cases, the quality of the action reflects on the quality of the agent, so that a negative emotion is warranted. One virtue of this suggestion is that it provides an explanation of why so many have been tempted by the claim that blame involves emotions (see Wallace 1995, p. 75).
The “leghista” movements came into being at the end of the 1970s, in several regions of northern Italy, particularly in Veneto, Lombardy and, to a certain extent, Piedmont. Although they relate specifically to European regionalist traditions on an autochthonous basis, the strength of their popular consensus gains leverage from several phenomena present in those Italian regions: antimeridionalismo, anti-statism and the economic divide between the north and the south of the country, especially with regard to the Northeast. Towards the end of the 1990s, this localism and demand for an ethnic identity for the “northern people” situated in the mythical “Padania” also became a way to channel the growing racism related to the immigration of non-EU citizens which, at that time, was turning into an unheard-of social phenomenon, in terms of both the quantity of flows, with respect to the recent past, and the cultural and political debate which continued to develop as a consequence.

The leghista movements’ programme is simple and opportunistic: it vindicates federalism in order to achieve multiple objectives of an economic nature, the dismantlement of the social welfare state, the reduction of fiscal pressure and deregulation. The aim is to free the country’s productive social forces from the seemingly most inactive social figures: trade unionists, politicians, public officials, etc.

In order to understand leghismo, it is undoubtedly important to interpret the social changes which have taken place in western countries and in Italy, from the crisis of class relations to the birth of a new population of medium and small businessmen, from migratory flows to the welfare system crisis, etc. But it is just as important to comprehend the emotional tone of the leghista movement; the deep-rooted bond between leghismo and the sentiment which is common to many northern citizens. The deep-rooted foundations of leghismo cannot be understood unless we recognize its great ability to make a political use of Northern Italy’s resentment.

Resentment is a destructive social energy which, throughout history, has often revealed its explosive capacity, especially when fuelled by an ideology that is always on the lookout for new scapegoats. For thousands of years, the “witch-hunt” has always been the most effective device for the reconstruction of the social order, although nowadays, the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, the credibility of the law and the cultural foundations of social and professional identity have need of a more intense restructuring, as no “outpouring” towards a scapegoat can resolve the true cause of the current unease, which is rooted in the principles of individual power, economic engineering and extreme and trying competition.

This paper addresses the question: ‘What role, if any, should resentment play in contemporary democracies?’ In recent moral and political philosophy several important attempts have been made to justify or rehabilitate resentment as an emotion that can and ought to play an important role in sustaining democratic norms. On this view, resentment should be given a voice in democratic deliberations and public law. Jeffrie Murphy argues that resentment is an emotion through which individuals legitimately assert their dignity and self-respect in the face of criminal offences (Murphy 1998, 2003). Resentment, he claims, is a crucial instrument of retributive justice. In their analysis of transitional democracies, Margaret Walker, Thomas Brudholm and Mihaela Mihai, share the view that it is morally comprehensible and politically counter-productive to disparage or devalue victim resentment about past injustices (Walker 2006; Brudholm 2008; Mihai 2010). They argue that the transition to democracy in the aftermath of conflict requires public institutions, legal procedures and rituals that duly recognise and facilitate the expression of resentment. Resentment, they argue, is a crucial instrument of restorative justice. They maintain that resentment should be a fundamental emotion in consolidated and transitional democracies because it constitutes a normative marker of unjust violations and a demand for the restoration of equal respect. Resentment is an emotional guardian of fundamental democratic norms.

Yet, modern political and moral thought does not give us a univocal account of resentment. In contemporary debates regarding resentment we can discern the legacy of at least two quite different theories or concepts of reactive emotions. On the one hand, those who defend resentment’s moral and political credentials often draw on eighteenth century Scottish moral sentiment theory to defend their account and evaluation of this emotion. On the other, Friedrich Nietzsche, deploying the French term ressentiment, argues that far from being a part of the natural, indispensable equipment of moral life, ressentiment is a pathological disorder that disrupts and poisons all social and political relations. Ressentiment, he argues, generates excessive and endless reactions that aim not at achieving or restoring moral parity, but at injuring and spoiling others. Put simply, then, regarding
resentment/ressentiment the eighteenth century Scottish tradition is sanguine, the nineteenth century Germanic tradition sanguinary. These two traditions confront us with an either/or: either resentment/ressentiment is a guardian of justice or it should be excluded from the political and legal domains as a pathological threat to any sense of measure or order.

This paper will address the question of the role of resentment/ressentiment in democracies through a comparative assessment of these two theories. First, it will clarify their competing interpretations of resentment/ressentiment. Second, it will identify and unpack the different philosophies of the emotions and moral and political perspectives that underpin their conceptualisation of resentment/ressentiment. Finally, it will draw on this comparative analysis to assess whether from the point of view of sustaining democratic norms resentment/ressentiment is fatally flawed or its excesses are simply aberrations that are amenable to political regulation.

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Marriage is about love, since the 19th century onwards unless. If we ask people around us about the basis for a solid relationship, love will be at the top of the list. What we look for in a relationship is a dependable, sincere, and affectionate partner. Someone to love until death. Resentment is out of focus, here. It has nothing to do with ‘real’ marriage. It has nothing to do with love.

The romantic concept of love we could find in this definition of marriage is the source of deep tensions between partners and, more interesting, into the subject itself. Confronted with difficult situations, ‘love’ could be replaced with others (negative) feelings: hate, anger, and, commonly, resentment. The arousal of these feelings could generate a crisis within marriage, leading to the failure of the relationship. Or, in other situations, it could generate an identity crisis in one of the members of the marriage, putting his/her inner self at risk.

I will explore the difficult conciliation of love and resentment when one of the members of the marriage suffers a chronic disease. The narratives of the other part (the caregivers) show how this task is supposed to be the supreme proof of love, but at the same time, we can detect how resentment is repressed, as something that could damage the very identity of the caregiver. The case study will help to explore how the repression of resentment shapes the experience of disease, and is capital for the creation of the social identity of both: the “caregiver” and the sick.

Arthur Conan Doyle will be my first case study. The story is well known. In 1892, just after a holydays in Switzerland, Louise Doyle (Arthur’s wife) was diagnosed as having a severe case of tuberculosis. For the following fourteen years, Arthur cared of his wife. She had only been given three months to live in late 1893. If she lived for thirteen years more, it was because Arthur’s care. This is a complex case, and we can approach it from different perspectives. Arthur Conan Doyle was a doctor, and he even attended a demonstration of a cure for tuberculosis by Professor Robert Koch in Berlin, in 1890. We know that he employed all his medical expertise in caring Louise. Care is not just about emotions, but also about technical skills. We can follow this path, but there are others we can explore too. Arthur was a rich man. Sherlock Holmes’ adventures were a great success in late Victorian England, and Arthur became rich and famous. After Louise’s disease, they travelled to Davos, Italy, and Egypt. He built a new house (Undershaw) in Surrey, where the weather was supposed to improve Louise’s health. He bought the best medicines, and consulted with the best doctors. Care is an economical matter, and Conan Doyle had money enough to spend in Louise’s treatments. But care is a social task, as well. The social self of the caregiver is at stake, and if he or she fails, the consequences could be the worst. This was Conan Doyle’s case, also. He was the head of her family. Not only his wife and children, but her siblings and mother look at him for support. He had adopted this role from his childhood. He could not fail, his family and his own inner self were at risk.

Technical skills, money, and social role. Care is about all that. And care is about emotions, of course, about love. We care of our loved ones, and we say their pain hurts us. We suffer with them, and we can cope with suffering because we love them. But, what happens when love fails? In 1897 Conan Doyle met Jean Leckie, and he fell in love with her. This relationship lasted until Louise’s death. For the next ten years, Arthur tried to square his passion for Jean with his responsibility towards Louise. And here is where resentment (accompanied with self-deception, frustration, and remorse) appeared.

Through his letters and diaries, I will study this period of Arthur Conan Doyle’s life, paying special attention to the emotional turmoil produced by this situation.
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